

# **The Productivity J-Curve: How Intangibles Complement General Purpose Technologies**


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CAER-Productivity Commission Workshop on  
“Prospects for a Post-Pandemic Productivity Boom”  
November 11, 2022

Based on joint work with Erik Brynjolfsson and Daniel Rock

# Technological Progress: ML and Image Recognition


## ImageNet Challenge Results



# Technological Progress: ML and Protein Folding

## STRUCTURE SOLVER

DeepMind's AlphaFold 2 algorithm significantly outperformed other teams at the CASP14 protein-folding contest — and its previous version's performance at the last CASP.



# The Disappointing Recent Reality

Juxtaposed with technological progress is slow productivity growth, everywhere

- We are 15+ years into a slowdown among OECD countries
  - Australia, labor productivity (GDP/hr) growth:
    - 1995-2004: 2.2% per year
    - 2005-2021: 1.2% per year
  - OECD: 27 of 32 countries saw slowdowns after 2004, average slowdown of 0.9% per year
- Major emerging markets slowdown later, around 2010

# A Potential Explanation for the Paradox

Our earlier work: Implementation and restructuring lags

- Technology is real, but benefits take time to emerge
  - Must accumulate enough new general purpose technology (GPT) capital to observe effects in aggregates
  - Full benefits require complementary investments to be invented and installed

If this is correct, the paradox is not a contradiction

- A period with simultaneous recognition of technology's potential and poor productivity performance is natural

# What Is a GPT?

Bresnahan and Trajtenberg's Criteria:

1. Pervasive
2. Able to be improved upon over time
3. Able to spawn complementary innovations

# Slowdowns and GPTs in History

Prior general purpose technologies (GPTs) associated with implementation lags

- “Engels’ pause” during early industrial revolution
  - Wage growth stagnant even as output rose quickly
- Over half of U.S. manufacturing establishments unelectrified in 1919
  - 30 years after AC systems standardized
- Computer capital in U.S. topped off at about 5% of total nonresidential equipment capital by late 1980s
  - 25+ years after invention of integrated circuit
  - Only half that level 10 years earlier

# GPT-Tied Intangibles & Productivity Measures

The productivity J-curve is a (mis-)measurement phenomenon that can happen when a new technology requires complementary intangible investments

We theoretically characterize this potential using standard growth accounting

Empirically estimate effects from past GPTs (computer software and hardware) and, more speculatively, AI



# Intangibles and Productivity Measurement

How do intangibles affect productivity measurement?

$$Productivity = \frac{Output}{Input}$$

- Intangible capital would be an unmeasured input
  - As such, this will tend to cause productivity to be overstated
- However, intangible capital is also an output (measured as investment flow)
  - This will cause productivity to be understated
- Net effect on productivity measurement depends on relative timing of input vs. output mismeasurement

# Intangible Growth Accounting

Standard production function:  $Y = AF(K, L)$

Standard Solow residual TFP:  $g_A = g_Y - \left(\frac{rK}{Y}\right) g_K - \left(\frac{wL}{Y}\right) g_L$

Intangible ( $U$ )-augmented production:  $Y + \phi I_U = A^* F^*(K, U, L)$

Intangible-augmented TFP growth:

$$g_{A^*} = \left(\frac{Y}{Y + \phi I_U}\right) \left(g_Y - \left(\frac{rK}{Y}\right) g_K - \left(\frac{wL}{Y}\right) g_L - \left(\frac{r_U U}{Y}\right) g_U\right) + \left(\frac{\phi I_U}{Y + \phi I_U}\right) g_{I_U}$$

# Intangible Growth Accounting

Define total output  $Y^* \equiv Y + \phi I_U$  and intangible investment's share of total output  $\eta_t$ , so  $Y_t = (1 - \eta_t)Y_t^*$

Difference between standard Solow residual and true TFP is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \underbrace{-\eta_t \left( \left( \frac{rK}{Y} \right) g_K + \left( \frac{wL}{Y} \right) g_L \right)}_{\substack{\text{Intangible Capital Investment Produced} \\ \text{by Tangible Capital Inputs and Labor}}} + \underbrace{(1 - \eta_t) \left( \frac{r_U U}{Y} \right) g_U}_{\substack{\text{Contribution to Measured Output} \\ \text{of Intangible Capital Stock}}} \\
 &+ \underbrace{g(1 - \eta_t)}_{\substack{\text{Growth in the} \\ \text{Measured Share of Output}}
 \end{aligned}$$

# Intangible Growth Accounting

If (as is often done) capital's share is measured as 1 – labor's share, payments to intangibles will be relabeled as tangible capital income

Accounting for this additional mismeasurement, as well as assuming  $g_U = g_K$  (as in our empirical approach), yields a simple expression relating true TFP and the standard Solow residual:

$$g_{A^*} = (1 - \eta_t)g_A + \eta_t(g_{IU} - g_K)$$


# The J-Curve

How might we expect this mismeasurement to evolve?

- Early in a GPT diffusion process, intangible investment growth  $g_{IU}$  likely larger than growth in capital input stock  $g_K$ 
  - Logic: Have to build intangibles before use as an input
- Hence new intangible diffusion will initially make true productivity higher than the Solow residual
- But later output growth will slow, causing Solow residual to overstate true productivity growth
- Eventually, in steady state, intangible investment output and capital inputs grow at similar rates—mismeasurement stabilizes

# The J-Curve

Toy Economy: The Productivity Growth Mismeasurement J-Curve  
Calculation of Capital Share as  $1 - (wL/Y)$



# Empirical Strategy

- Use firm value regressions to infer intangibles associated with measureable investments
  - Regressing firm market value on types of capital show how \$1 of capital type X is valued by the market
  - A weight above 1 implies capital type is valued at an amount greater than investment & implies the presence of complementary intangibles
- Use estimates to construct implied productivity mismeasurement
- Integrate to find implied difference in TFP levels

# Firm Value Regressions: R&D

Table 1: Market Value Regressions on R&D and SG&A Stocks

Market Value Regressions (1962-2017)	(1) Basic R&D	(2) Basic R&D and SG&A	(3) Industry-Year Fixed Effects: R&D	(4) Industry-Year Fixed Effects: R&D and SG&A	(5) Firm and Year Fixed Effects: R&D	(6) Firm and Year Fixed Effects: R&D and SG&A
Total Assets	1.016 (0.00179)	0.998 (0.00232)	1.015 (0.00853)	0.999 (0.0107)	1.013 (0.00725)	0.997 (0.0110)
R&D Stock	2.730 (0.105)	1.753 (0.0970)	2.841 (0.479)	1.953 (0.399)	2.161 (0.297)	1.509 (0.278)
SG&A Stock		1.755 (0.102)		1.657 (0.399)		1.453 (0.374)
Constant	656.8 (14.32)	458.7 (18.06)				
Firm-Year Observations	268,687	268,687	266,795	266,795	267,683	267,683
R-squared	0.987	0.988	0.989	0.989	0.993	0.993
Industry-Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Firm and Year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes


Robust standard errors in parentheses



# Firm Value Regressions: R&D

- Tangible “standard” capital in Total Assets appears to be valued dollar-for-dollar, both across companies and within companies over time
- OTOH, \$1 of R&D appears to be associated with \$2 of shadow value, so perhaps \$1 dollar of intangibles
- SG&A proxy for intangibles captures some of this, but also seems to be correlated with shadow value above \$1

# Measured and Adjusted TFP Growth: R&D



# Adjusted TFP: R&D


Why is mismeasurement so small if for every dollar of R&D there is an implied additional \$1 of intangible capital?

It's because R&D investment rates have been stable for many decades

Thus  $g_{IU} \approx g_K$

This can be seen in TFP level breakdown into missing output (investment) and input (stock) components


# Measured and Adjusted TFP Levels: R&D




# Firm Values: Hardware and Software

- We don't have firm-level IT capital data as we did for R&D
- We instead proceed by computing implied mismeasurement for different values of  $\lambda/z$  based on the literature
  - Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002) estimate \$1 of computer hardware and software associated with about \$12 (s.e. = \$4) of market value
  - We use  $\lambda/z$  of \$10, though also compute for \$5, \$3, and \$2

# Adjusted TFP Growth: IT Hardware




# Adjusted TFP Levels: IT Hardware



# Adjusted TFP Levels: IT Hardware

Productivity Levels (1980=100) with Intangible Computer Multipliers






# Adjusted TFP: IT Hardware

Adjusted TFP level is 3.7% higher in 2016 than measured


- Note this is the total growth measurement error accumulated over almost 50 years
- First half of *growth* J-curve has played out; hardware-related intangible accumulation has lately caused productivity growth overstatement (and brought levels back toward measured level)

# TFP Growth Mismeasurement by Year: IT Hardware




# TFP Accumulated Level Mismeasurement: IT Hardware

TFP Level Mismeasurement Percentage with Computer Intangibles ( $\lambda/z = 10$ )




# Adjusted TFP Growth: IT Software

Quarterly Total Factor Productivity Growth (Annualized %)



# Adjusted TFP Levels: IT Software




# Adjusted TFP: IT Software

Implied mismeasurement due to software-related intangibles is much larger than for intangibles related to R&D or hardware

Adjusted TFP level is 12.4% higher in 2016 than measured


First half of growth J-curve might be played out, but less clear than for hardware

# TFP Growth Mismeasurement by Year: IT Software



# TFP Accumulated Level Mismeasurement: IT Software

TFP Level Mismeasurement Percentage with Software Intangibles ( $\lambda/z = 10$ )





# Does This Explain the Post-2004 Productivity Slowdown?

No; implied slowdown actually larger, at least through 2018

A mismeasurement explanation for the slowdown doesn't just require mismeasurement. It requires:

- *A change* in mismeasurement
- In a particular direction
- Around 2004

# Are AI-Related Intangibles Causing Mismeasurement Already?

- Still very early in AI adoption, but fast investment growth
- IDC estimates Australian AI investments of \$1.9B in 2022
  - Expected annual growth of 24% going forward
- If each observed dollar of AI investments is correlated with about \$5 in additional intangible investments, that implies current annual GDP is 0.4% ( $= \$9.5/2300$ ) higher than observed
  - Not implausible
  - However, pre-2020 AI investments probably too small to have had aggregate effects, so only recent part of story

# Conclusion

- New technologies often require complementary intangible investments
- These intangibles can lead to productivity mismeasurement
  - First as missing output (productivity understatement)
  - Later as missing input (productivity overstatement)
- Recently, this dynamic appears to have largely played out for R&D- and hardware-related intangibles
- Still in play for software-related intangibles
- AI-related intangibles might just now be creating enough mismeasurement to matter for aggregates